Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Charles Noussair, Jonathon Silver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction. Bidders' decisions move closer to equilibrium levels over time in the auction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-206
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume55
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2006
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • All-pay
  • Auction
  • Experiment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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