Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)407-425
Number of pages19
JournalSynthese
Volume197
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Axiomatic bargaining
  • Bargaining theory
  • David Gauthier
  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Game theory
  • John Nash
  • Social contract theory
  • Social norms
  • Utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

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