Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Justin P. Bruner

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4

Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Justin P. Bruner

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	407-425
Number of pages	19
Journal	Synthese
Volume	197
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4
State	Published - Jan 1 2020
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Axiomatic bargaining
Bargaining theory
David Gauthier
Evolutionary game theory
Game theory
John Nash
Social contract theory
Social norms
Utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
General Social Sciences

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10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4

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KW - John Nash

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KW - Utilitarianism

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Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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