TY - GEN
T1 - Banshee
T2 - 47th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2026
AU - Li, Jiarui
AU - Brewington, Joseph
AU - Zhang, Qingzhao
AU - Mao, Z. Morley
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 IEEE.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - Gimbal-stabilized visual tracking is critical for modern autonomous systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). While prior work shows acoustic signals can disturb gimbal internals, the impact of such attacks on real-world applications like UAV tracking and following remains underexplored. Existing demonstrations largely overlook practical challenges for real-world attacks, such as object-motion uncertainty and runtime latency. To bridge this gap, we present Banshee11.Our attack is named after the banshee, a mythical spirit whose scream causes or signals harm, reflecting the attack's acoustic nature., the first physically realizable attack that induces target switching in UAV visual tracking systems by exploiting acoustic vulnerabilities in gimbal-camera systems. Banshee generates carefully crafted acoustic waveforms that induce optimized adversarial gimbal oscillations, causing directionally biased camera-view drifts that break inter-frame target associations. Consequently, the onboard tracker is driven to switch from the original target to an attacker-selected object with high probability, with occasional target loss. Banshee achieves a 93.6% success rate in simulation across two commercial gimbal systems and five trackers. Real-world benchtop and in-flight black-box attacks against a commercial drone across varied scenarios show an overall 95.5% attack success rate. Our results reveal a practical cross-domain vulnerability between acoustics and vision, highlighting the need for robust designs of gimbal systems and applications.
AB - Gimbal-stabilized visual tracking is critical for modern autonomous systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). While prior work shows acoustic signals can disturb gimbal internals, the impact of such attacks on real-world applications like UAV tracking and following remains underexplored. Existing demonstrations largely overlook practical challenges for real-world attacks, such as object-motion uncertainty and runtime latency. To bridge this gap, we present Banshee11.Our attack is named after the banshee, a mythical spirit whose scream causes or signals harm, reflecting the attack's acoustic nature., the first physically realizable attack that induces target switching in UAV visual tracking systems by exploiting acoustic vulnerabilities in gimbal-camera systems. Banshee generates carefully crafted acoustic waveforms that induce optimized adversarial gimbal oscillations, causing directionally biased camera-view drifts that break inter-frame target associations. Consequently, the onboard tracker is driven to switch from the original target to an attacker-selected object with high probability, with occasional target loss. Banshee achieves a 93.6% success rate in simulation across two commercial gimbal systems and five trackers. Real-world benchtop and in-flight black-box attacks against a commercial drone across varied scenarios show an overall 95.5% attack success rate. Our results reveal a practical cross-domain vulnerability between acoustics and vision, highlighting the need for robust designs of gimbal systems and applications.
KW - acoustic injection
KW - gimbal
KW - object tracking
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105044387041
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105044387041#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1109/SP63933.2026.00129
DO - 10.1109/SP63933.2026.00129
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105044387041
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP - 1539
EP - 1557
BT - Proceedings - 47th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2026
A2 - Oprea, Alina
A2 - Nita-Rotaru, Cristina
A2 - Papernot, Nicolas
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 18 May 2026 through 21 May 2026
ER -