Autonomy and Options

Autonomy is a widely affirmed ideal in modern societies. Autonomous people lead their lives, at least to some substantial extent, on their own terms. Assuming that autonomy is a genuine good, this chapter asks what makes an option set adequate or optimal for people insofar as we are concerned with its contribution to their autonomy. The chapter offers neither a grand formula nor a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an option set being either adequate or optimal along this dimension. Instead, it critically discusses a range of factors that plausibly bear on these determinations. More specifically, the chapter contends that option sets are best conceived in terms of optimality, not adequacy, and that the conditions of both optimality and adequacy for option sets are considerably more demanding than they are commonly taken to be, that there is no plausible case for providing all members of society with an optimal or even adequate range of options, that access to bad options (options that are immoral or otherwise valueless) can be necessary for option sets to be adequate at least for some, that an autonomy-supporting choice environment has a conservative dimension that stands in tension with dynamic markets and a welcoming embrace of technological and cultural change, and, finally, that the impact of interpersonal interference, as contrasted with natural obstruction, on the value of our option sets is not as significant as commonly maintained.