Aristotle'S Virtues of Greatness

This chapter focuses on the Aristotelian virtues of 'magnificence' and 'magnanimity,'rejecting the popular view that here Aristotle reveals a conception of the virtues asseemly qualities of members of a grand, influential elite. Against this, it is argued first thatsome virtues are restricted to specific groups because only members of those groupswill have the relevant occasion to develop and exercise those virtues; and there isnothing elitist about the thought that unusual social prominence can be such an occasion.Second, it is argued that it is exactly this thought that underlies Aristotle's account ofmagnificence and magnanimity, which require distinctive forms of practical reasoning thatare made salient only by demands peculiar to positions of social prominence. Lastly, theidea that some virtues are distinctive just in virtue of belonging to an elite classindividuates virtues without reference to differences in practical reasoning betweenthem. Such an idea, it is argued, is inimical to the very structure of an Aristotelian virtuetheory.