Abstract
Aristotle's arguments in NE 3.5 target Plato's position that vice is not blameworthy but to be pitied because involuntary, i.e. contrary to our wish for our good - not the 'Socratic paradox' that wrongdoing is involuntary. To this end, Aristotle develops a causal account of voluntary action based on Plato, Laws 9, but replaces Plato's character-based classification of actions with his own distinction between performing actions of a certain type and having a character of that type. This distinction, central to Aristotle's account of character-formation by habituating actions, allows Aristotle to show how character, whether vicious or virtuous, can be voluntary.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 57-83 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Phronesis |
Volume | 64 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- action
- blame
- character
- habituation
- involuntary
- vice
- voluntary
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science