Abstract
Whether competitive bidding or negotiated sale leads to lower borrowing cost for municipal debt issuers has been studied extensively in municipal finance research. There is a potential self-selection bias when estimating the relative cost effectiveness of these two methods of sale. This article argues that sale method can be viewed as a certification mechanism as issuers self-select themselves into either competitive or negotiated groups based on their perception of the underlying degree of information asymmetry. By correcting for this self-selection bias, we find that for issues with no or little information asymmetry, neither sale method has a significant cost advantage over the other.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 73-95 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Public Budgeting and Finance |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2003 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Public Administration