An INS Monitor to Detect GNSS Spoofers Capable of Tracking Vehicle Position

Cagatay Tanil, Samer Khanafseh, Mathieu Joerger, Boris Pervan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

78 Scopus citations


In this paper, we describe and evaluate a new monitor that uses inertial navigation system (INS) measurements to detect spoofing attacks on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers. Spoofing detection is accomplished by monitoring the Kalman filter innovations in a tightly coupled INS/GNSS mechanization. Monitor performance is evaluated against worst case spoofing attacks, including spoofers capable of tracking vehicle position. There are two main contributions of this paper. The first is a mathematical framework to quantify postmonitor spoofing integrity risk. The second is an analytical expression of the worst case sequence of spoofed GNSS signals. We then apply these to an example spoofing attack on a Boeing 747 on final approach. The results show that GNSS spoofing is easily detected, with high integrity, unless the spoofer's position-tracking devices have unrealistic, near-perfect accuracy, and no delays.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number8010424
Pages (from-to)131-143
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2018


  • GNSS
  • INS
  • Integrity
  • Kalman Filter
  • RAIM
  • Spoofing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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