An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Andreas Blume; Uri Gneezy

doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2573

An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Andreas Blume
, Uri Gneezy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	161-172
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	90
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2573
State	Published - Jan 2000
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Coordination; learning; language; common knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1999.2573

Cite this

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title = "An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games",

abstract = "This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92",

keywords = "Coordination; learning; language; common knowledge",

author = "Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy",

note = "Funding Information: 1This paper was conceived while both authors were at the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. We thank CentER for its hospitality and financial support through the CentERpanel. A. Blume acknowledges support through a grant from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9808947). We are grateful to Ido Erev and Drew Fudenberg for comments.",

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AU - Gneezy, Uri

N1 - Funding Information: 1This paper was conceived while both authors were at the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. We thank CentER for its hospitality and financial support through the CentERpanel. A. Blume acknowledges support through a grant from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9808947). We are grateful to Ido Erev and Drew Fudenberg for comments.

PY - 2000/1

Y1 - 2000/1

N2 - This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92

AB - This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92

KW - Coordination; learning; language; common knowledge

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JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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