An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Andreas Blume, Uri Gneezy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Scopus citations


This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)161-172
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2000


  • Coordination; learning; language; common knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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