All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Andreas Blume; Paul Heidhues

doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Andreas Blume
, Paul Heidhues

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	170-177
Number of pages	8
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	114
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2
State	Published - Jan 2004
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Reserve price
Second-price sealed-bid auction
Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

Cite this

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title = "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction",

abstract = "This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.",

keywords = "Reserve price, Second-price sealed-bid auction, Uniqueness",

author = "Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to Georgios Katsenos, Joel Sobel, an anonymous referee, and the associate editor for comments. Blume thanks the WZB, where this paper was written, for its hospitality and the NSF (SBR-9808947) for financial support. Heidhues thanks the German Science Foundation (DFG, Ro2080/1-2) for financial support.",

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AU - Heidhues, Paul

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AB - This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

KW - Reserve price

KW - Second-price sealed-bid auction

KW - Uniqueness

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DO - 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2

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JO - Journal of Economic Theory

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All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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