All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

50 Scopus citations


This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)170-177
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2004


  • Reserve price
  • Second-price sealed-bid auction
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'All equilibria of the Vickrey auction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this