Admissibility and common belief

Geir B. Asheim; Martin Dufwenberg

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1

Admissibility and common belief

Geir B. Asheim, Martin Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	208-234
Number of pages	27
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	42
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1
State	Published - Feb 2003
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1

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title = "Admissibility and common belief",

abstract = "The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.",

author = "Asheim, {Geir B.} and Martin Dufwenberg",

note = "Funding Information: During our collaboration, which J{\"o}rgen Weibull was instrumental in initiating, we have had helpful discussions with many scholars, including Pierpaolo Battigalli, Adam Brandenburger, Stephen Morris, and Larry Samuelson. We have also benefited greatly from extensive communication with an associate editor and challenging comments from a referee. Asheim gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Northwestern and Harvard Universities and financial support from the Research Council of Norway.",

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AU - Dufwenberg, Martin

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PY - 2003/2

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N2 - The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

AB - The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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IS - 2

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Admissibility and common belief

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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