Abstract
This chapter advocates austere metaphysical realism - a form of metaphysical realism claiming that a correct ontological theory will repudiate numerous putative entities and properties that are posited in everyday thought and discourse, and also will even repudiate numerous putative objects and properties that are posited by well-confirmed scientific theories. There are various potential versions of the generic position of austere metaphysical realism; and the generic view that constitutes the ontological part of the overall approach to realism and truth is described.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Truth and Realism |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191594304 |
| ISBN (Print) | 0199288887, 9780199288878 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1 2010 |
Keywords
- Austere metaphysical realism
- Generic position
- Ontological theory
- Truth
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities