A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

Mark Walker

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2

A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

Mark Walker

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	111-127
Number of pages	17
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	32
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2
State	Published - Feb 1984
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2

Cite this

@article{470caefd2b3a4cb789d658bb5bca3056,

title = "A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties",

abstract = "A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.",

author = "Mark Walker",

note = "Funding Information: *The research reported here would never have been done had it nor been for earlier collaboration with Thomas Muench. Marcel K. Richter made a number of helpful comments, as did a referee and an associate editor. This research was partially supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.",

year = "1984",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "32",

pages = "111--127",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

AU - Walker, Mark

N1 - Funding Information: *The research reported here would never have been done had it nor been for earlier collaboration with Thomas Muench. Marcel K. Richter made a number of helpful comments, as did a referee and an associate editor. This research was partially supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

PY - 1984/2

Y1 - 1984/2

N2 - A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.

AB - A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0010358414

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0010358414#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2

DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0010358414

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 32

SP - 111

EP - 127

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this