TY - JOUR
T1 - A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
AU - Walker, Mark
N1 - Funding Information:
*The research reported here would never have been done had it nor been for earlier collaboration with Thomas Muench. Marcel K. Richter made a number of helpful comments, as did a referee and an associate editor. This research was partially supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
PY - 1984/2
Y1 - 1984/2
N2 - A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.
AB - A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0010358414
VL - 32
SP - 111
EP - 127
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -