A new solution to moore's paradox

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25 Scopus citations


Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddness against the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions to the problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But "consistency" is a theory-laden concept, having different contours in different semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriate only if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning with truth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate when it comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory which accounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals (Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary. It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lense of an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)237-250
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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