Un resoconto humeano del pluralismo morale

Translated title of the contribution: A humean account of moral pluralism

Michael B. Gill

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Pluralist views of morality hold that there are multiple fundamental moral principles, and that these principles can require incompatible courses of action. So on the pluralist view, there can be a basic, underived moral reason to perform an action and a basic, underived moral reason to refrain from performing it. This conflict may be not merely apparent but real, and there may be no way of dissolving the conflict. I argue that Hume's sentimentalist account of morality is pluralist, and also that Humean sentimentalism is the most powerful basis for moral pluralism.

Translated title of the contributionA humean account of moral pluralism
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)571-588
Number of pages18
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2012


  • David hume
  • Moral pluralism
  • Sentimentalism
  • Threshold deontology
  • W.D. Ross

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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