A game-theoretic model for establishing maintenance service contracts

Maryam Hamidi, Haitao Liao, Ferenc Szidarovszky

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Maintenance service for a critical system can be outsourced to an agent under a service contract. In this case, making an agreement between the operator of the system (customer) and the agent on the service contract is quite complex due to the unavoidable uncertainties in system failures and spare part logistics. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to address the joint decision-making problem where the agent's spare part ordering policy and the customer's maintenance schedule must be determined as part of the service contract. Considering a cooperative decision-making process for the agent and the customer, a detailed model and solutions are presented. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the use of the game-theoretic model in maintenance and service logistics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2013
EventIIE Annual Conference and Expo 2013 - San Juan, Puerto Rico
Duration: May 18 2013May 22 2013


OtherIIE Annual Conference and Expo 2013
Country/TerritoryPuerto Rico
CitySan Juan


  • Game theory
  • Maintenance outsourcing
  • Optimization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering


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