Abstract
Abstract: In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account of belief reports.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 446-463 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Mind & Language |
Volume | 10 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1995 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Language and Linguistics
- Philosophy
- Linguistics and Language