A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


In this paper, I assess Derk Pereboom’s argument for the thesis that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I argue that the Frankfurt-style example Pereboom develops presupposes a prior act or omission which the agent was able to avoid. This undermines his argument. I propose a way for Pereboom to revise his example and thereby undercut this objection. Along the way, I also argue that Pereboom should supplement his account of what counts as a robust alternative—an alternative of the sort that should matter to those who argue for an ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3117-3129
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number12
StatePublished - Dec 1 2018


  • Frankfurt-style examples
  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility
  • Pereboom

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


Dive into the research topics of 'A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this