Abstract
In this paper, I assess Derk Pereboom’s argument for the thesis that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I argue that the Frankfurt-style example Pereboom develops presupposes a prior act or omission which the agent was able to avoid. This undermines his argument. I propose a way for Pereboom to revise his example and thereby undercut this objection. Along the way, I also argue that Pereboom should supplement his account of what counts as a robust alternative—an alternative of the sort that should matter to those who argue for an ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 3117-3129 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 175 |
Issue number | 12 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2018 |
Keywords
- Frankfurt-style examples
- Free will
- Moral responsibility
- Pereboom
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy