Abstract
This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 675-708 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | International Economic Review |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 2002 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
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