TY - JOUR
T1 - A comparison of multiple-unit all-pay and winner-pay auctions under incomplete information
AU - Barut, Yasar
AU - Kovenock, Dan
AU - Noussair, Charles N.
PY - 2002/8
Y1 - 2002/8
N2 - This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.
AB - This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00031
DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00031
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036687220
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 43
SP - 675
EP - 708
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -