TY - JOUR
T1 - A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
AU - Blume, Andreas
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ I am grateful to Françoise Forges, Maria Goltsman, Maxim Ivanov, Navin Kartik and Joel Sobel for comments. I am also indebted to two anonymous referees who have helped to substantially improve the paper. My stay at the Institute for Advanced Study was funded through a Roger W. Ferguson Jr. and Annette L. Nazareth Membership. * Correspondence to: Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, United States. E-mail address: [email protected].
PY - 2012/7
Y1 - 2012/7
N2 - This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford-Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ε-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use.
AB - This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford-Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ε-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use.
KW - Communication
KW - Correlation
KW - Information transmission
KW - Language
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84860616013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84860616013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84860616013
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 75
SP - 510
EP - 517
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -