A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game

Joanna Masel

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.003

A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game

Joanna Masel

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	216-231
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	64
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.003
State	Published - Oct 2007

Keywords

Conditional expected utility
Rationality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.003

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title = "A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game",

abstract = "Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.",

keywords = "Conditional expected utility, Rationality",

author = "Joanna Masel",

note = "Funding Information: I thank Aviv Bergman, Sam Bowles, Marc Feldman, Lilach Hadany, Paul Higgins, Ben Kerr, Adi Livnat, John Miller, Henrique Pereira, Leo Simon and Russell Thomson and two anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and comments on the manuscript. Research was supported by NIH grant GM28016 to Marc Feldman, the Center for Computational Genetics and Biological Modeling at Stanford, and the BIO5 Institute at the University of Arizona. ",

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PY - 2007/10

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N2 - Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.

AB - Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.

KW - Conditional expected utility

KW - Rationality

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A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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