TY - JOUR
T1 - A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game
AU - Masel, Joanna
N1 - Funding Information:
I thank Aviv Bergman, Sam Bowles, Marc Feldman, Lilach Hadany, Paul Higgins, Ben Kerr, Adi Livnat, John Miller, Henrique Pereira, Leo Simon and Russell Thomson and two anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and comments on the manuscript. Research was supported by NIH grant GM28016 to Marc Feldman, the Center for Computational Genetics and Biological Modeling at Stanford, and the BIO5 Institute at the University of Arizona.
PY - 2007/10
Y1 - 2007/10
N2 - Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.
AB - Models of learning, reciprocity and altruism cannot explain all aspects of observed contributions in the public good game. Here a new model is described in which players recognize a correlation between their own contribution and the likely contributions of other players. The correlation is calculated by treating a player's own conjectured contribution just like any other data point within a learning model. Although players recognize that this correlation is not causal, they nevertheless choose to maximize expected utility conditional on their own action rather than standard expected utility. Results from the model explain previously puzzling quantitative trends in the data.
KW - Conditional expected utility
KW - Rationality
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34548526428
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 64
SP - 216
EP - 231
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
IS - 2
ER -